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mination of different minimum wages for different occupations, although
purportedly made under sections 1(b) and 6 as read in conjunction, will be
held invalid. Such determination would thwart legislative intent in providing
for an opportunty for a hearing, notice requirements and a statement of
findings before a valid wage determination could be reached. It would also
result in an infringement upon fundamental standards of due process in
failing to provide an opportunity to introduce evidence and to make argu-
ments/ GEORGE M. FORD
Communications Law—Communications Act of 1934—Right of a Party
in Interest to a Trial-type Hearing upon a Challenge to a License Appli-
cation.—Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 1—Interstate (hereinafter re-
ferred to as WQXR), a class I-B AM radio station operating at 50 kilowatts
on 1560 kc in New York City, challenged the applications for broadcasting
permits made by intervenors Patchogue and Grossco? The Commission
22 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1 (1938).
1 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2 In 1957, Patchogue applied for a construction permit to operate a new AM
station at Riverhead, Long Island, on 1570 kilocycles with a power of 1 kilowatt, to
broadcast daytime only. In 1959 the application was granted without a hearing. WQXR
filed a protest under § 309(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, as
amended, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715 (1952), ch. 1, 70 Stat. 3 (1956), which then pro-
vided:
When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commission with-
out a hearing . . . such grant shall remain subject to protest , . . for a period
of thirty days. . . . Any protest . .. shall contain such allegations of fact as
will show the protestant to be a party in interest, and shall specify with
particularity the facts relied upon by the protestant as showing that the grant
was improperly made or would otherwise not be in the public interest. The
Commission shall . . . render a decision making findings as to the sufficiency
of the protest in meeting the above requirements; and, where it so finds, shall
designate the application for hearings upon issues relating to all matters
specified in the protest . . . except with respect to such matters as to which
the Commission, after affording protestant an opportunity for oral argument,
finds, for reasons set forth in the decision, that, even if the facts alleged were
to be proven, no grounds for setting aside the grant are presented.
In 1959, Grossco applied for its permit to establish a 1 kilowatt, daytime only
station on 1550 kilocycles in the Hartford, Conn., area. WQXR petitioned to intervene
under § 309(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, ch.
879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715 (1952), which then provided:
If upon examination of any such application the Commission is unable
to make the finding specified in subsection (a), it shall forthwith notify the
applicant and other known parties in interest of the grounds and reasons for
its inability to make such finding. . . . The parties in interest, if any, who are
not notified by the Commission of its action with respect to a particular appli-
cation may acquire the status of a party . . . by filing a petition for inter-
vention showing the basis for their interest. . . . Any hearing subsequently
held upon such application shall be a full hearing in which the applicants and
all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate .
Both § 309(b) and (c) were amended in 1960, 74 Stat. 889, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp.
IV, 1959-62).
760
CASE NOTES
relied upon its rules governing allocation of frequency channels, which, when
applied to these license application proceedings, amounted to a legislative
presumption that the advantages of new adjacent channel service outweighed
the disadvantages occasioned by loss of existing service beyond the normally
protected contours In both cases WQXR's basic contention was that special
circumstances, namely, superior programming fare, established the public
interest in maintaining its broadcasting service beyond its normally pro-
tected 0.5 millivolt per meter contour, and that this militated against the
granting of the permits. The Commission rejected this contention without
a hearing on the ground that it alleged no more than a claim on a matter
which had already been foreclosed, as a matter of policy in 1957, in its
deletion of the "unique service" rule. 4 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia it was HELD• The Commission did not deal ade-
quately with WQXR's contention that special circumstances created a
public interest justifying the extension of protection to its broadcasting
service beyond the normally protected service area. Only by balancing the
public interest factors of the benefit of new service against the loss of existing
service can the Commission decide the ultimate question of public interest.
The court goes a long way in implementing the doctrine of United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 5 wherein the Supreme Court decided that more
flexibility was necessary in administering the Communications Act of 1934.
The net effect of the instant case may well be to place the administration
of the Act on an ad hoc basis. Henceforth, it would seem, no broadcasting
license will be granted until the ultimate issue of public interest has been
adjudicated in a full evidentiary hearing.' However, flexibility is not the
8 Station WQXR, as a Class I-B station, is protected at least to its 0.5 millivolt per
meter (mv/m) groundwave contour from stations operating on the same and adjacent
channels. 47 C.F.R. 3.182(a)(1)(ii) (1958). The term "millivolt per meter" relates to
signal strength intensity, which decreases as the distance increases from the transmitter.
"Groundwave" refers to that portion of electrical waves which is propagated along the
earth's surface. Thus, WQXR is protected to the outer limits of the geographical area
receiving a signal rated at .5 mv/m or higher. It sought protection beyond this area. The
Regulations resolving the issue of protected contour in this case are: 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.11-
(a), (c), 3.21(a), 3.182(a) (1), (f), (h), and (j) (1958), cited by the court in the instant
case, supra note 1, at 800-01,
4 Patchogue Broadcasting Co., 23- Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 435, 439-42 (FCC
1962); Grossco Broadcasting Corp., 23 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 707, 718 (FCC 1962).
In essence, WQXR's allegations called for a 'comparison of the relative merits of the
program services and a finding that its service was so superior that it deserved extra-
ordinary protection. The Commission abandoned its efforts to protect such "unique
service" in 1957 on the grounds that no workable definition of unique service could
be attained and that its attempts to protect such service had resulted only in detriment
to the public by discouraging applicants with threatened -delay and by inducing them
to water down their proposals for new service. 16 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 1501,
1504 (FCC 1957).
5 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
6 This would be so at least where someone challenges the grant of a construction
permit. Standing to challenge is easy to establish. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) and Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d
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only feature desired in administering the Communications Act and it may
have been purchased at too dear a price. For, as the court recognizes, this
decision presents serious problems of abuse of the intervention and protest
devices.
As a practical matter, then, under our ruling, an established
and powerful station can delay the grant of new applications for
apparently available frequencies by setting up a barrage of allega-
tions as to why the established station should be protected at
distant points well beyond its normally protected contour, because
of the "unique service" it renders. Allegations of this sort are not
hard to make . . . .7
The court was of the view that it had no choice but to follow Storer. Granting
the constraint of precedent, it does not appear that Storer necessarily com-
pelled the result in the instant case. Nor does it appear that the court
correctly applied Storer.
In Storer, the question before the Court was whether a corporation
subject to the authority of the Commission could obtain a waiver of the
amended Multiple Ownership Rules.s On the very day the amendments
were promulgated, Storer's application for an additional television station
was dismissed by reason of these amendments. The Commission's regulations
then in effect provided for a waiver of any of its rules upon a showing of
good cause.° The Supreme Court held that, while the Commission had the statu-
tory authority
to limit the number of stations consistent with a permissible "con-
centration of control," . . . we read the Act and Regulations as
providing a "full hearing" for applicants who have reached the
existing limit of stations, upon their presentation of applications
conforming to Rules 1.361(c) and 1.702, that set out adequate
reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended."
Storer has been roundly criticized by Professor Davis as failing to
recognize the distinction between "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts and
the type of hearing required in their respective determinations.'' Professor
879 (D.C. Cir. 1955) held that possible impairment of a licensee's ability to serve the
public as a result of harmful competition suffices to give a party standing. It is on
this theory that WQXR was held to have standing to object to the grants in the in-
stant case. Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Patch-
ogue); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Grossco).
7 Supra note I, at 803.
8 These Rules limited single ownership of broadcast stations to 5 television stations,
§ 3.636, 7 AM stations, § 3.35, and 7 FM stations, § 3.240, 18 Fed. Reg. 7799 (1953).
0 § 1.361 (c), 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-414 (1946), as amended, 18 Fed. Reg. 7195 (1953);
1.702, 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-424 (1946), superseded by 47 CF.R. § 1.15 (1958).
to Supra note 5, at 203, 205.
11 Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 197-98
(1955). Professor Davis distinguishes "adjudicative" from "legislative" facts as follows:
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Davis is doubtless correct in his thesis that a trial-type, or evidentiary,
hearing is not essential to the determination of the legislative facts which
provide the policy foundation for the formulation of rules such as those in
Storer and in the instant case. Nevertheless, the need for flexibility in the
functioning of administrative bodies may justify holding a trial-type hearing
if an individual party alleges facts which if proven would show that the
public interest would best be served by not applying the rule in his case.
It is upon this ground that Storer can be defended.
The Commission therefore did not bind itself inflexibly to the
licensing policies expressed in the Regulations. In each case that
comes before it the Commission must still exercise an ultimate
judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity." If time and changing circum-
stances reveal that the "public interest" is not served by application
of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act
in accordance with its statutory obligations.' 2
In Storer the court found this "flexibility . . . under the present § 309(a)
and (b) and the FCC's [waiver] regulations." 18
Storer involved an application for new broadcasting facilities; the
instant case involves challenges to applications for new facilities. Denial
of Storer's application meant that the public would be deprived altogether
of the benefit of a new television station; denial of WQXR's challenges
would mean only that the public would get new local broadcasting service
at the expense of allegedly superior service it had before, service of a kind
Adjudicative facts are facts about the parties and their activities, . . . usually
answering the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what
motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a
jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law,
policy, and discretion.
.. [A]djudicative facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily
ought not to be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and
meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them, that is, without providing
the parties an opportunity for trial. . . . Yet people who are not necessarily
parties, frequently the agencies and their staffs, may often be the masters of
legislative facts.. .. [T]he method of trial often is not required for the deter-
mination of disputed issues about legislative facts.
Id. at 199.
For the proposition that due process requires a trial-type hearing for the deter-
mination of adjudicative facts, see Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); another
case found that there is no such requirement when legislative facts are at issue. Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
Professor Davis criticizes the Supreme Court in Storer for failing "to inquire whether
any issue of adjudicative fact was presented. . . [I]f Storer merely sought to attack
the multiple ownership rules, argument and not trial was the appropriate procedure...."
Id. at 197-98.
12 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
13 Supra note 5, at 205.
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the Commission had found itself unable to protect under any reasonable
definition and standard of public interest."
Conceding the validity and applicability of Storer, this would not have
precluded the court in the instant case from holding that WQXR had failed
to allege "facts, sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver of the Rules,"
or that the Commission erred only in failing to supply a sufficient explanation
why the facts alleged were insufficient. Storer may be read as holding that sec-
tion 309(b) gives a party standing only to request a rules waiver." There
is nothing in Storer that prevents the Commission from testing the sufficiency
of the allegations upon which the requested waiver is based. On the con-
trary, it seems expressly to call for such a test.
As the Commission has promulgated its Rules after extensive ad-
ministrative hearings, it is necessary for the accompanying papers
to set forth reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver
of the Rules."
If the Commission were allowed to utilize a demurrer or motion-to-
dismiss device on a requested rules waiver, all that would be necessary by
way of a hearing would be argument on the sufficiency of the allegations."
Yet it appears that under the instant decision an applicant or other
party in interest has a right to a trial-type hearing on his request for a rules
waiver, a hearing defined in Storer as one in which "every party shall have
14
 It is true that WQXR would be finally foreclosed by a denial of its requested
rules waiver. But public, not private, interest is the criterion, and the detriment to the
public from the denial of WQXR's challenges would not be so great as in a case where
the denial of an application meant total deprivation of new service.
15 "Congress did not intend the governmental agencies created by it to perform use-
less or unfruitful tasks. If it is perfectly clear that petitioner's appeal for a hearing con-
tains nothing material and the objections stated do not abrogate the legality of the
order attacked, no hearing is required by law." Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Inc. v. Flem-
ming, 271 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960); Superior
Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 609-15 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L.
Week 3236 (Dee. 18, 1963) (both relying on Storer). Superior Oil presents the Supreme
Court an excellent opportunity to define the right of a party in interest to a trial-type
hearing.
14 Supra note 5, at 205.
17 This was exactly what 309(c), quoted in note 2, provided for, and what the
1960 amendment of 309 provides. Under the 1960 amendment, the Commission may
use a demurrer device on both interventions and protests. It appears also to impose a
good faith requirement on challengers by specifying that affidavits accompany those
allegations of fact other than those which the Commission may judicially notice. The
purpose of the 1960 amendment was to remedy the procedural abuses (delay and har-
rassment) that arose out of misuse of 309(b) and (c). H.R. Rep. No. 1800, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3516, 3517 (1960). The same purpose
was announced for the 1956 amendment of § 309(c), the protest section. S. Rep. No.
1231, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2195 (1956). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has shown a marked reluctance to effectuate this
purpose. Hudson Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 320 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Wometco Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 314 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (both applying 1960
amendment).
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the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."' Such hearings are often
unduly protracted and excessively expensive; their ready availability would
frequently serve only to discourage applicants and prospective applicants?
The FCC is charged with the task of determining whether considera-
tions of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" favor the granting of
a license to establish and operate a broadcast station.2° So nebulous a
standard as "public interest" is extremely difficult of application and neces-
sarily implies a great deal of discretion on the part of the agency applying
it.21 In order to accomplish the statutory objective of furnishing the public
the best broadcasting service possible, Congress also equipped the Com-
mission with certain specific criteria and conferred on it not only the ordinary
administrative rule-making power but also the authority to formulate broad
policy rules, enunciating the Commission's own attitudes on public interest. 22
The Multiple Ownership Rules and the presumption in favor of new adjacent
channel service over the recognized but unprotected service are products of
this broad legislative power.
Such rules were held in Storer, however, to lack the sanctity of Con-
gressional enactments. This interpretation is reasonable in view of the
necessity for flexible administration of a national broadcasting policy ac-
cording to the protean standard of public interest and in view of the fact
that an agency, when applying its own policies, can achieve a flexibility
that no court dealing with a Congressional act is capable of. In other words,
the circumstances of an individual case may indicate that it would be better
not to apply a particular ordinance founded upon the public interest. A
court, faced with a Congressional act which applies to the case at bar, is
not in the best position to make an exception to the general statutory rule.
Not having made the law and not being apprised of all the underlying policy
considerations, the court cannot be expected to know whether Congress in-
18 Supra note 5, at 202.
19 Elias, Administrative Discretion—No Solution in Sight, 45 . Marq. L. Rev. 313,
314-16 (1962). Both the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240, 243 (1946), 5
U.S.C. 44 1005(a) and 1009(e) (1958), and the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
1066, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 4 154(j) (1958), provide that agency proceedings shall be
conducted with reasonable speed. In Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856
(1961), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the principle that a party may
seek equitable relief in the federal district courts from oppressive agency action.
20 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 4 309(a)
(Supp. IV, 1959-62). National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra note 12, at
214-26 (excellent review of the history of the Act).
21 "[I]2 is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied that the public
interest will be served by renewing the license. And the fact that we might not have
made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a substitution of
judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the
latter." FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946).
22 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1066, 1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
El 154(1), 303(f)(r) (1958).
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tended that there be such an exception. On the other hand an administrative
agency acting as a court is perfectly adapted to making a judicial exception
to its own legislative pronouncements.23
But certain practical difficulties are presented. It must be conceded that
when the Commission, in the exercise of its discretion and expertise, formu-
lates a general policy rule, adherence to that rule ought to be excused only
in the most exceptional case and then only upon a showing of good cause.
For, while the administration of a national broadcasting policy demands
flexibility, it also demands stability and predictability.
This does not mean, of course, that the mere filing of an applica-
tion for a waiver . . . would necessarily require the holding of a
hearing, for if that were the case a rule would no longer be rule.24
An individual seeking a broadcast license has a right to expect thaethe rules
of the Commission will be observed unless there is a clear showing of ai
strong public interest against their observance. He has a right not to be delayed,
discouraged or harassed. Further, the public interest requires that these
rights be secured him because the public interest is advanced by competition
and diversification.
In following Storer, the court in the instant case held that section 309(6)
and (c) provided for the contingency that in a given case the public detri-
ment from the impairment of existing service might exceed the benefit of
new service by stating that a "party in interest" is entitled to participate
in a license application proceeding in order to help determine whether the
grant of a license is in the public interest.
Section 309(c) provided for a means of testing the sufficiency of the
protestant's allegations of a favorable public interest. A like ability could
be read into section 309(b), 25 despite the fact that, before 309(c) was
amended to provide for a demurrer test, it was practically identical with
309(b) and had been interpreted to provide for a trial-type hearing on all
23 Consider, e.g., the Multiple Ownership Rules, which, as applied to television
facilities, proscribe single control of more than seven (no more than five VHF) televi-
sion stations. 47 C.F.R. § 3.636 (1958). Suppose a party with seven stations applies
for a television license in an area that has no television service. The Commission could
waive application of the Rule in this case. If, however, the same blanket proscription
were embodied in a congressional act, there would be no justification for its waiver either
by the Commission or the courts. For an example of a pre -Storer waiver of a Com-
mission regulation, see City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System v. FCC,
223 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
24 Brief for the FCC in Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra note 5,
quoted by the Court at 201.
25 In Federal Broadcasting System v. FCC, 231 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court
(at 250) indicated that the Commission could employ a demurrer device on a protest
under § 309(c), as it then stood, 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat.
715 (1952), even though it contained no explicit provision for one. See generally, Harbenito
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 218 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But see, Elm City Broad-
casting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956) and Clarksburg Pub-
lishing Co. v. FCC, infra note 26.
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protests. 26 The Commission in effect interpreted both sections to permit
such a test and dismissed WQXR's objections for want of sufficient allega-
tions of public interest. And in both cases the Court of Appeals apparently
acquiesced in this action. Still, in order to discharge its statutory obligation
of judicial review, the court must have a record adequate to determine the
correctness of the Commission's order?"' Here it felt it was faced with no
more foundation for the Commission's disposition of WQXR's contention
than a few summary remarks.28
 Thus, it had no alternative to reversal ex-
cept abdication in favor of the complete and undisclosed discretion of the
Commission.
In doing so, however, the court appears to have done nothing toward
solving the problem presented by abuse of the protest and intervention de-
vices. For it states:
If the Commission concludes that the allegations are not sufficient
it may decide both cases against WQXR, provided it supports its
conclusions with explanations founded on sufficient findings of facts.
In its discretion it may hold further hearings even if not required
to do so. 29
 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the strength of this language one might conclude that no trial-type hear-
ing would be necessary to make the "findings of fact" of which the court
speaks.3° Yet a reading of Judge Washington's concurring opinion (in which
the other two judges concurred) indicates that such a hearing must be held.
If the Commission grants a hearing, the ensuing delay will
no doubt be substantial, and the expenses probably such as to be
a heavy burden to Patchogue and Grossco, which evidently lack
the financial resources of WQXR. If the Commission decides
against WQXR, without a hearing, a further appeal to this court
by WQXR would seem probable?'
It is submitted that the court might have done something to solve the
problem of dilatory and worrying tactics posed by an abuse of the proce-
dures for challenging license applications instead of merely recognizing
and compounding it. Its mandate to the Commission might and should have
2° Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
27 Television Corp. of Mich. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Telan-
serphone, Inc. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 732, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
28 Supra note 1, at 801-02.
20 Supra note 1, at 802.
3° Whether or not a party in interest is entitled to a trial-type hearing on any
and all allegations of favorable public interest is the crucial question in this case. The
court is of little help in supplying an answer. How is the Commission to support its
decision with "findings of fact" unless it holds a trial-type hearing? It is true that
"some findings rest on judgment or discretion or policy, which in turn rests on the
kind of facts that are not necessarily susceptible of proof," and hence need not be made
in an evidentiary hearing. 2 Davis, Administrative Law § 16.11 (1958). But the "find-
ings of fact" the court refers to in this case do not appear to be that kind. Anglo-
Canadian Shipping Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 310 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1962).
37 Supra note 1, at 802-03.
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been: Give WQXR the opportunity for oral argument on its allegations of
public interest. Decide, upon the basis of the facts alleged and upon all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them, whether these
facts, if proven, would show that the public interest demands that extraor-
dinary protection be accorded WQXR's broadcasting service. If you de-
cide that the allegations are insufficient to warrant additional protection,
you must give a full explanation why they are insufficient. If you decide
that they are sufficient, you must give WQXR an opportunity to prove them
in a trial-type hearing 82 Had the court done this, it would have contributed
greatly toward a rational reconciliation of the conflicting demands of flexi-
bility and predictability in the administration of the Communications Act.
JEROME K. FROST
Constitutional Law—First Amendment Protection of the Right to Picket
and State Public Policy.—Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Cti
Confectionary Workers.'—This action was commenced by respondent-cor-
poration in the Los Angeles County Court to enjoin appellant-union's alleged
trespass upon property which respondent had leased from the City of Tor-
rance, California, and was operating as a shopping center. Appellant, in its
attempt to organize the employees of Revels' Bakery Shop, a sub-lessee in the
center, commenced and maintained, over respondent's objection, a peaceful
organizational picket line on the center's sidewalk immediately in front of
the sub-lessee's shop.2 The county court granted an injunction on the basis
that the center's sidewalk had been provided for use by the sub-lessee's
actual and potential customers; appellant, by its maintenance of the picket
line, was not using the sidewalk for its intended purpose; such action con-
stituted a trespass. 2 The primary question on appeal was whether a lessee
of property, who has the right to exclusive possession and is not a party to a
labor dispute, can enjoin, as a trespass, peaceful organizational picketing
directed at the business premises of a sub-lessee-employer. HELD: The dis-
32 This is all that is required by the 1960 amendment. 74 Stat. 889, 47 U.S.C.
{ 309(d) (Supp. IV, 1959-62), which provides:
(2) If the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the pleadings
filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that there are no sub-
stantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the application
would be consistent with subsection (a) of this section, it shall make the grant,
deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of the reasons for denying
the petition, which statement shall dispose of all substantial issues raised by
the petition.
In view of the inability of the Commission and the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia to accomplish the Congressional objective of providing an expeditious
means of hearing objections to the applications for construction permits, the best
solution may well be to abolish the intervention and protest procedures altogether. The
Commission could then admit adverse parties in interest at its discretion. Southwestern
Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1 222 Cal. App. 2d 378, 35 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1963).
2 Respondent is not a party to any labor dispute.
a Restatement, Torts {{ 157-164 (1938) especially 4 158.
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